Israeli–Palestinian conflict · Chapter 3 · Statehood and recognition · question 2 of 2
Why did the peace talks of 2000 to 2008 end without an agreement?
Last reviewed
Background · 7 key momentsHow the talks unfoldedNew to the subject? Start here.
11–25 July 2000
At Camp David, President Clinton hosted Israel’s prime minister, Ehud Barak, and the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, for a summit on a final peace agreement. It ended without one. [1]Remarks by the President on the Middle East peace talks at Camp David(opens another site in a new tab)
28 September 2000
Ariel Sharon, then leader of Israel’s opposition, visited the Temple Mount, which Muslims call the Haram al-Sharif, with more than 1,000 police officers. Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli police confronted each other there the next day; the violence that followed became known as the second intifada. [2]Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee report (the Mitchell report)(opens another site in a new tab)
23 December 2000
Clinton set out his parameters for an agreement to both delegations. [3]“The Aftermath of Camp David 2000” (Dennis Ross interviewed on Fox News)(opens another site in a new tab)[4]The Clinton Parameters(opens another site in a new tab)
21–27 January 2001
Negotiators met at Taba, in Egypt, and ended by declaring they had never been closer. Israel then suspended contacts until after its election. [5]Israeli–Palestinian joint statement at the end of the Taba talks(opens another site in a new tab)[6]“Taba talks end without deal; no more contacts before vote”(opens another site in a new tab)
27 November 2007
At Annapolis, in the United States, Israel’s prime minister, Ehud Olmert, and the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, launched negotiations on “all core issues without exception”. [7]Joint Understanding read by President Bush at the Annapolis Conference(opens another site in a new tab)
September 2008
Olmert presented a proposal to Abbas, as he prepared to resign as prime minister. [8]“Ehud Olmert in his own words: What I offered President Abbas”(opens another site in a new tab)[9]Report on the Olmert–Abbas meeting of September 2008(opens another site in a new tab)
December 2008
The talks, already stalled, were formally suspended by the Palestinians on 29 December, two days after Israel launched an operation against Hamas in Gaza. [10]Israel: Background and U.S. Relations (RL33530)(opens another site in a new tab)
In brief
Argued in support of the Palestinian position
What was put forward was not a viable state: at Camp David ideas were conveyed orally, in 2008 the map was withheld, East Jerusalem and the refugees were left without a fair answer, settlements kept growing, and the talks ended with Israeli elections and a prime minister on his way out.
At Camp David nothing was put in writing, and even Israel’s foreign minister later said he would have rejected it in Arafat’s place. The White House recorded that both sides accepted Clinton’s parameters with reservations. At Taba the two sides’ maps were about 3 percentage points apart, and Israel stopped the talks before its election. In 2008 Olmert would not hand over his map, proposed annexing all the settlements in East Jerusalem, and was about to resign; Rice herself said Abbas did not think he could deliver. The PLO said the Camp David proposals left Israel in control of East Jerusalem, borders and airspace. An international committee found no persuasive evidence that the Palestinian Authority planned the intifada, and asked Israel to freeze settlement.
Where this is argued: [11]“Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors”(opens another site in a new tab)[9]Report on the Olmert–Abbas meeting of September 2008(opens another site in a new tab)
Argued in support of Israel’s position
Israel made far-reaching proposals, a state on nearly all of the West Bank and Gaza with the Arab parts of Jerusalem, and the Palestinian leadership accepted none of them: Arafat refused at Camp David, answered Clinton with reservations that undid his parameters, and Abbas let Olmert’s proposal lapse.
At Camp David Barak went further than any Israeli leader, and Clinton said he had moved more than Arafat; participants on the American side found that Arafat neither said yes nor made a counter-proposal. Clinton’s parameters offered 94 to 96 per cent of the West Bank and the Arab parts of Jerusalem, and Clinton later called Arafat’s answer a rejection and “an error of historic proportions”. In 2008 Olmert offered more again; Abbas did not take it, and declined Rice’s suggestion to deposit it with President Bush. The violence after Camp David made Israelis doubt that concessions would bring peace.
Where this is argued: [12]“Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak)”(opens another site in a new tab)[3]“The Aftermath of Camp David 2000” (Dennis Ross interviewed on Fox News)(opens another site in a new tab)
What it turns on: The sources on this page show that what was proposed at Camp David was conveyed orally; that the White House recorded both sides as accepting Clinton’s parameters with reservations; that the Taba talks ended before Israel’s election with the parties saying they had never been closer; and that Abbas did not accept Olmert’s 2008 proposal, which was shown to him but not handed over. The sides disagree on whether what was offered amounted to a viable state, on whether the Palestinian reservations and responses amounted to a rejection, and on how far violence and settlement growth undid the talks.
A note on terms
Shares of the West Bank offered in these talks are counted in different ways: with or without East Jerusalem and other areas, before or after land swaps, and on a map or only in words. This page gives each figure with who gave it; where accounts of the same proposal differ, as for Olmert’s in 2008, it gives each with its source rather than reconcile them.
Israel’s supporters speak of a “generous offer” refused; Palestinian negotiators and some American participants say that what was put forward at Camp David was ideas, not an offer that could be accepted. This page says “proposal” and gives each side’s word in its own column.
Point by point
Point 1 of 5
What was proposed at Camp David in July 2000, and how did each side respond?
Argued in support of the Palestinian position
- Position ·Robert Malley and Hussein Agha
Malley and Agha wrote: “The ideas put forward at Camp David were never stated in writing, but orally conveyed.” By their account, “Palestine would have sovereignty over 91 percent of the West Bank; Israel would annex 9 percent of the West Bank and, in exchange, Palestine would have sovereignty over parts of pre-1967 Israel equivalent to 1 percent of the West Bank”.
[11]“Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors”(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Dennis Ross
Dennis Ross himself said: “at Camp David we did not put a comprehensive set of ideas on the table.”
[3]“The Aftermath of Camp David 2000” (Dennis Ross interviewed on Fox News)(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Bill Clinton
Clinton said, after praising Barak: “I was not condemning Arafat, I was praising Barak.”
[1]Remarks by the President on the Middle East peace talks at Camp David(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Shlomo Ben-Ami
Israel’s foreign minister at the time, Shlomo Ben-Ami, said in 2006: “Camp David was not the missed opportunity for the Palestinians, and if I were a Palestinian I would have rejected Camp David, as well.”
[13]“Fmr. Israeli Foreign Minister: ‘If I Were a Palestinian, I Would Have Rejected Camp David’”(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Robert Malley and Hussein Agha
Malley and Agha wrote that the usual account “fails to capture why what so many viewed as a generous Israeli offer, the Palestinians viewed as neither generous, nor Israeli, nor, indeed, as an offer.”
[11]“Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors”(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·PLO
The PLO told the Mitchell committee that Israel’s proposals at Camp David “provided for Israel’s annexation of the best Palestinian lands, the perpetuation of Israeli control over East Jerusalem, a continued military presence on Palestinian territory, Israeli control over Palestinian natural resources, airspace and borders”.
[14]Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee report (the Mitchell report)(opens another site in a new tab) - Interpretation
A share of territory says little on its own: what mattered was whether the state would be contiguous, control its own borders and airspace, and have its capital in East Jerusalem, and the proposals at Camp David did not offer that.
Argued in support of Israel’s position
- Position ·Ehud Barak
In Ehud Barak’s account, given to the historian Benny Morris, “The proposals included the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state on some 92 percent of the West Bank and 100 percent of the Gaza Strip, with some territorial compensation for the Palestinians from pre-1967 Israeli territory”.
[12]“Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak)”(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Bill Clinton
Closing the summit, President Clinton said that “the Prime Minister moved forward more from his initial position than Chairman Arafat, on -- particularly surrounding the questions of Jerusalem.”
[1]Remarks by the President on the Middle East peace talks at Camp David(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Dennis Ross
The American mediator Dennis Ross said of Arafat: “during the fifteen days there, he never himself raised a single idea.”
[3]“The Aftermath of Camp David 2000” (Dennis Ross interviewed on Fox News)(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Robert Malley and Hussein Agha
Robert Malley, a member of Clinton’s team, and Hussein Agha record Clinton telling Arafat: “You have been here fourteen days and said no to everything.”
[11]“Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors”(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Robert Malley and Hussein Agha
Malley and Agha also wrote that the Palestinians “were unable either to say yes to the American ideas or to present a cogent and specific counterproposal of their own.”
[11]“Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors”(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Ehud Barak
Barak said of Arafat: “He did not negotiate in good faith, indeed, he did not negotiate at all. He just kept saying ‘no’ to every offer, never making any counterproposals of his own”.
[12]“Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak)”(opens another site in a new tab) - Interpretation
Proposals touching Jerusalem and most of the settlements called for a Palestinian answer that could be negotiated; refusals without a counter-proposal were not one.
Point 2 of 5
Did both sides accept the Clinton Parameters of December 2000?
Argued in support of the Palestinian position
- Position ·White House
At the time, the White House said: “Chairman Arafat told the President that he had accepted the President's parameters; at the same time, he expressed some reservations. What that means is that both sides have now accepted the President's ideas with some reservations.”
[15]“White House says Arafat accepted Clinton's ideas with reservations”(opens another site in a new tab) - Factual claim
The Parameters were not handed over in writing: “No written text was presented.” On refugees they offered “no specific right of return to Israel itself”.
[4]The Clinton Parameters(opens another site in a new tab)[16]The Clinton Parameters (English text)(opens another site in a new tab) - Interpretation
Whether Arafat’s reservations undid the Parameters is a judgment, not a record: both sides attached reservations, and only Arafat’s are now called a rejection.
Argued in support of Israel’s position
- Factual claim
In December 2000 Clinton proposed “94-96% of the West Bank territory of the Palestinian State”, and that “The land annexed by Israel should be compensated by a land swap of 1-3% in addition to territorial arrangements such as a permanent safe passage.” In Jerusalem, “The general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli. This would apply to the Old City as well.” He asked that “the agreement clearly mark the end of the conflict and its implementation put an end to all claims.”
[4]The Clinton Parameters(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Bill Clinton
Clinton later wrote: “Arafat’s rejection of my proposal after Barak accepted it was an error of historic proportions.”
[17]Bill Clinton, My Life (excerpt)(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Dennis Ross
Dennis Ross, who was present when Arafat gave his answer at the White House on 2 January 2001, said: “He said yes, and then he added reservations that basically meant he rejected every single one of the things he was supposed to give.”
[3]“The Aftermath of Camp David 2000” (Dennis Ross interviewed on Fox News)(opens another site in a new tab)
Point 3 of 5
How close did the Taba talks come, and why did they end?
Argued in support of the Palestinian position
- Factual claim
The two delegations ended the Taba talks by declaring: “The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections.” Moratinos recorded maps about 3 percentage points apart: “The Israeli side sketched a map presenting a 6 percent annexation, the outer limit of the Clinton proposal. The Palestinian illustrative map presented 3.1 percent in the context of a land swap.”
[5]Israeli–Palestinian joint statement at the end of the Taba talks(opens another site in a new tab)[18]The Moratinos non-paper on the Taba negotiations(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Ehud Barak’s office
Barak’s office then said he would “not continue with diplomatic contacts with Arafat and his people until after the elections in Israel.”
[6]“Taba talks end without deal; no more contacts before vote”(opens another site in a new tab)
Argued in support of Israel’s position
- Position ·Miguel Moratinos
At Taba, according to the EU envoy Miguel Moratinos, “The Palestinian side did not agree that the parameters included blocs, and did not accept proposals to annex blocs.”
[18]The Moratinos non-paper on the Taba negotiations(opens another site in a new tab) - Interpretation
“Never been closer” is not an agreement: the gaps that remained were on the questions that matter most to Israel, refugees and the end of claims among them.
Point 4 of 5
What did Ehud Olmert propose in 2008, and how did Mahmoud Abbas respond?
Argued in support of the Palestinian position
- Position ·Condoleezza Rice
Rice’s own account says: “Since Olmert won't give him the map, we draw a map and show him what it is.” And: “Abbas doesn't think Olmert can deliver.”
[19]Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Hadley oral history(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Mahmoud Abbas
Abbas denies Rice’s account of the refugee remark: “I absolutely did not say that.”
[20]“Rebutting Abbas, Condoleezza Rice confirms her account of their 2008 refugee conversation” (archived copy)(opens another site in a new tab) - Factual claim
When Olmert and Abbas met in September 2008, “Olmert entered the meeting in a weakened position after his decision to submit his resignation this month when his party picks a new leader.”
[9]Report on the Olmert–Abbas meeting of September 2008(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Saeb Erekat
The Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat said: “we will not be part of an interim or shelf agreement”.
[9]Report on the Olmert–Abbas meeting of September 2008(opens another site in a new tab) - Factual claim
The Palestine Papers, as reported by the BBC, show that “Mr Olmert had proposed that Israel annex 6.8% of the West Bank, including the four main settlement blocs of Gush Etzion, Maale Adumim, Givat Zeev and Ariel, as well as all of the settlements in East Jerusalem, in exchange for the equivalent of 5.5% of Israeli territory.”
[21]Report on the Palestine Papers(opens another site in a new tab)
Argued in support of Israel’s position
- Position ·Ehud Olmert
The map Olmert later showed to the BBC has Israel annexing “4.9% of the West Bank”. On refugees he said he told Abbas: “I told him I would never agree to a right of return. Instead, we would agree on a humanitarian basis to accept a certain number every year for five years, on the basis that this would be the end of conflict and the end of claims.”
[22]Report on Olmert's 2008 map, shown publicly for the first time(opens another site in a new tab)[8]“Ehud Olmert in his own words: What I offered President Abbas”(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Condoleezza Rice
The US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, says she urged Abbas: “Take it. Come to the President of the United States, deposit it, and President Bush will pass it on to the next President of the United States.” Her account continues: “But he wouldn't do it.”
[19]Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Hadley oral history(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Condoleezza Rice
According to Rice, Abbas told her he could not tell “four million Palestinians that only five thousand of them can go home.”
[20]“Rebutting Abbas, Condoleezza Rice confirms her account of their 2008 refugee conversation” (archived copy)(opens another site in a new tab)
Point 5 of 5
What part did the second intifada and settlement growth play?
Argued in support of the Palestinian position
- Factual claim
The international fact-finding committee led by George Mitchell found: “neither were we provided with persuasive evidence that the PA planned the uprising.” It called on Israel to “freeze all settlement activity”.
[2]Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee report (the Mitchell report)(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Ahmed Qurei
In July 2008, during the Annapolis talks, the Palestinian negotiator Ahmed Qurei told Rice, according to the Palestinian record of the meeting: “Please – we need your help on settlements”.
[23]Meeting summary, Qurei and Rice, 16 July 2008 (the Palestine Papers)(opens another site in a new tab) - Interpretation
Building settlements on the land under negotiation made Palestinians doubt that the talks would end the occupation.
Argued in support of Israel’s position
- Position ·Imad Faluji
A Palestinian Authority minister, Imad Faluji, is reported to have said that the uprising “had been planned since Chairman Arafat's return from Camp David”.
[24]“The Second Intifada”(opens another site in a new tab) - Position ·Israeli government
The Mitchell committee recorded Israel’s position that “the expansion of settlement activity and the taking of measures to facilitate the convenience and safety of settlers do not prejudice the outcome of permanent status negotiations.”
[14]Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee report (the Mitchell report)(opens another site in a new tab) - Interpretation
The violence that followed Camp David, while talks went on, made Israelis doubt that giving up land would bring peace.
Sources
- Remarks by the President on the Middle East peace talks at Camp David (opens another site)The White House (archived)
- Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee report (the Mitchell report) (opens another site)The Avalon Project, Yale Law School
- “The Aftermath of Camp David 2000” (Dennis Ross interviewed on Fox News) (opens another site)The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- The Clinton Parameters (opens another site)Foundation for Middle East Peace (text as published in Haaretz)
- Israeli–Palestinian joint statement at the end of the Taba talks (opens another site)Jewish Virtual Library
- “Taba talks end without deal; no more contacts before vote” (opens another site)Jewish Telegraphic Agency
- Joint Understanding read by President Bush at the Annapolis Conference (opens another site)The White House (archived)
- “Ehud Olmert in his own words: What I offered President Abbas” (opens another site)Tom Gross Mideast Media (reproducing Olmert's account)
- Report on the Olmert–Abbas meeting of September 2008 (opens another site)NBC News (Associated Press)
- Israel: Background and U.S. Relations (RL33530) (opens another site)Congressional Research Service
- “Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors” (opens another site)The New York Review of Books (Robert Malley and Hussein Agha)
- “Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak)” (opens another site)The New York Review of Books (Benny Morris)
- “Fmr. Israeli Foreign Minister: ‘If I Were a Palestinian, I Would Have Rejected Camp David’” (opens another site)Democracy Now!
- Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee report (the Mitchell report) (opens another site)Jewish Virtual Library
- “White House says Arafat accepted Clinton's ideas with reservations” (opens another site)U.S. Department of State, Washington File
- The Clinton Parameters (English text) (opens another site)Economic Cooperation Foundation
- Bill Clinton, My Life (excerpt) (opens another site)Jewish Virtual Library
- The Moratinos non-paper on the Taba negotiations (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)
- Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Hadley oral history (opens another site)Miller Center, University of Virginia
- “Rebutting Abbas, Condoleezza Rice confirms her account of their 2008 refugee conversation” (archived copy) (opens another site)The Times of Israel
- Report on the Palestine Papers (opens another site)BBC News
- Report on Olmert's 2008 map, shown publicly for the first time (opens another site)BBC News
- Meeting summary, Qurei and Rice, 16 July 2008 (the Palestine Papers) (opens another site)Jewish Virtual Library (copy of the document published by Al Jazeera)
- “The Second Intifada” (opens another site)Jewish Virtual Library
- Jeremy Pressman, “Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?”, International Security (opens another site)Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School
Report an error or suggest a source on this page →
Change history
- Faluji’s reported remark (a13) now begins with him, not with the claim; the mark now says what context the statement leaves out.
- The statement by Barak’s office (b10) shown as a position.
- Statements reporting what a government, an organisation, a scholar or a witness says are now shown as that speaker’s position, with the speaker named; statements quoting two speakers are split in two.
- First publication.