Israeli–Palestinian conflict · Chapter 5 · Land and law since 1967 · question 2 of 3

What changed Palestinians’ lives in the West Bank and Gaza from the 1970s to the 2000s?

Last reviewed

Background · 8 key momentsHow the period unfoldedNew to the subject? Start here.
  1. June 1967

    In the Six-Day War, Israel took control of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, and put them under military rule. [1]Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion, with separate opinions and declarations(opens another site in a new tab)[2]Closure(opens another site in a new tab)

  2. 1972

    Israel issued general exit orders, letting Palestinians from the territories enter Israel to work. [2]Closure(opens another site in a new tab)

  3. From 1977

    Israel pursued a policy of establishing settlements in the territories. [1]Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion, with separate opinions and declarations(opens another site in a new tab)

  4. December 1987

    The first Palestinian uprising, or intifada, began. [3]A Raw Deal: Abuses of Thai Workers in Israel’s Agricultural Sector(opens another site in a new tab)[4]Adriana Kemp, “Labor Migration in Israel: The Creation of a Non-free Workforce”(opens another site in a new tab)

  5. March 1993

    After attacks that killed Israelis, Israel imposed a general closure, requiring individual permits to enter Israel. [2]Closure(opens another site in a new tab)[5]Israel’s Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip(opens another site in a new tab)

  6. September 1993

    The PLO and Israel recognised each other, and the Oslo process began; the 1995 Interim Agreement left the main issues to permanent status negotiations. [6]Text of mutual recognition letters (Arafat to Rabin)(opens another site in a new tab)[7]Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip(opens another site in a new tab)

  7. September 2000

    The second intifada began; by the end of 2005, about 3,400 Palestinians and about 1,000 Israelis had been killed. [8]197 Palestinians and 50 Israelis killed in 2005 (press release)(opens another site in a new tab)

  8. April 2002 onwards

    Israel’s cabinet decided to build what Israel calls a “security fence”, whose purpose, Israel says, is to stop attacks launched from the West Bank; most of the barrier’s route runs inside the West Bank. [1]Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion, with separate opinions and declarations(opens another site in a new tab)[9]Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le territoire palestinien occupé : avis consultatif (document A/ES-10/273)(opens another site in a new tab)[10]The Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier, July 2008(opens another site in a new tab)

In brief

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

The open years were still occupation, which kept the economy dependent; closure began before the suicide bombings and became permanent, and it collapsed Palestinian life.

Free movement into Israel was a permission granted by military order in 1972, not a right. Under occupation the Palestinian economy was tied to Israel’s: Israeli rules obstructed investment, took land and water, raised tariffs and collected the revenue, so that by 1992 a third of the workforce depended on jobs in Israel. Growth, Palestinian and World Bank economists found, brought no lasting development. Israel began restricting movement in 1989, years before the suicide bombings, imposed a general closure in 1993, and kept it through the Oslo years and on Israeli holidays. Human Rights Watch found it punished people who posed no threat. The barrier was built mostly inside the West Bank. When the closure tightened after 2000, incomes halved and nearly half of Palestinians fell into poverty.

Where this is argued: [11]The Palestinian economy: 1967-1994(opens another site in a new tab)[5]Israel’s Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip(opens another site in a new tab)

Argued in support of Israel’s position

Before the first intifada, Palestinians could enter Israel by day, worked there and grew richer; Palestinian violence forced the restrictions, and the losses that followed were its cost.

From 1972 Palestinians could enter Israel freely by day, and many worked there. Israel’s own reports, and a World Bank economist, record fast growth and rising living standards until the mid-1980s: incomes, housing, electricity, water and the first Palestinian universities. Then came the uprisings. The general closure of 1993 followed the killing of Israeli civilians and soldiers; the suicide bombings of the 1990s and 2000s killed hundreds more, and the restrictions tightened with the attacks. When the violence fell, as in 2005, the restrictions eased. The fence cut the suicide attacks where it was built. The jobs Palestinians lost were lost, above all, to the violence that made the restrictions necessary.

Where this is argued: [12]Economic development in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza district: report submitted by Israel to the United Nations(opens another site in a new tab)[13]Statement by Israel’s Foreign Ministry on the International Court of Justice hearing on the security fence (Daniel Taub, 23 February 2004)(opens another site in a new tab)

What it turns on: The sources on this page show that from 1972 Palestinians could enter Israel freely by day and many worked there; that incomes grew fast until the mid-1980s; that Israel restricted movement in steps from 1989, with a general closure from 1993 and much tighter restrictions after 2000; that the first intifada began in December 1987 and that attacks on Israelis, including the suicide bombings counted from 1994, accompanied the later steps; and that work in Israel, incomes and living standards then fell sharply. The sides disagree on how good the earlier years were, on whether the restrictions followed the violence or also served other purposes, and on what caused the decline.

A note on terms

The territory west of the Jordan taken by Israel in 1967 is called the “West Bank” internationally and “Judea and Samaria” by Israel’s government. On this page each side’s column uses its own term, and the site says “the West Bank”.

“Closure” is the term used by Israel and by human rights groups for sealing the territories off from Israel, generally or for a period. It differs from the checkpoints and roadblocks inside the territories, and from the permit system, which decided who could cross at all. [5]Israel’s Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip(opens another site in a new tab)

The barrier built from 2002 is called the “security fence” by Israel, the “separation barrier” by many international sources, and the “wall” by Palestinians. On this page each side’s column uses its own term, and the site says “the barrier”. [13]Statement by Israel’s Foreign Ministry on the International Court of Justice hearing on the security fence (Daniel Taub, 23 February 2004)(opens another site in a new tab)[10]The Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier, July 2008(opens another site in a new tab)

Point by point

Point 1 of 7

What was movement like before the first intifada?

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

  1. Factual claim

    After 1967 Israel’s military commanders declared the West Bank and Gaza “closed military areas”. The freedom to enter Israel came in 1972, by military order, and even then Palestinians could not stay in Israel overnight.

    [2]Closure(opens another site in a new tab)

Argued in support of Israel’s position

  1. Factual claim

    From 1972, under general exit orders, residents of the West Bank and Gaza could “leave freely, enter Israel and East Jerusalem, and pass between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank”, with the limit that they could not stay in Israel overnight, between 1 and 5 a.m.

    [2]Closure(opens another site in a new tab)

Point 2 of 7

What were economic opportunities and living conditions like before 1987, and what held them back?

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

  1. Position ·B’Tselem

    The Israeli human rights organisation B’Tselem describes Israel’s economic policy from 1967 to 1994 as “to partially integrate the Occupied Territories’ economy in Israel’s economy, perpetuating the weak and underdeveloped Palestinian economy”, by obstructing investment, taking land, limiting water and restricting agricultural exports to Israel. By 1992 one third of the Palestinian workforce worked in Israel and about 90 per cent of imports came from Israel.

    [11]The Palestinian economy: 1967-1994(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Position ·Fadle Naqib

    The Palestinian economist Fadle Naqib found that the economy “benefited significantly from its relationship with Israel in just the first decade, and then that relationship became harmful”; Israel had raised the territories’ tariffs about fourfold.

    [14]Fadle Naqib, “The Palestinian Economy: Dependence on Israel and Prospects for Integration with the Arab World” (working paper)(opens another site in a new tab)
  3. Factual claim

    A UN commission reports estimates that the tariff revenue Israel collected from 1970 to 1987 equalled 12 to 21 per cent of Palestinian GNP.

    [15]Countering economic dependence and de-development in the occupied Palestinian territory(opens another site in a new tab)
  4. Position ·Sébastien Dessus

    The World Bank economist Sébastien Dessus found that integration with Israel “did not bring significant ‘dynamic’ gains”.

    [16]Sébastien Dessus (World Bank), “A Palestinian Growth History, 1968-2000”, Journal of Economic Integration 19(3)(opens another site in a new tab)
  5. Factual claim

    Israel closed the universities “for months (and in the case of some universities, for years) during the First Intifada”.

    [17]Abdalhadi Alijla and others, “The Politics of Palestinian Universities”(opens another site in a new tab)
  6. Interpretation

    The good years were good mainly for Palestinians working in Israeli jobs, not for a Palestinian economy. Rising wages hid an occupation that kept the territories dependent, took their land and water, and left them nothing to fall back on when the gates closed.

Argued in support of Israel’s position

  1. Position ·Israeli government

    Israel reported to the UN in 1984 that since 1967 the territories’ economy had been “characterized by rapid growth and a very substantial increase in living standards”, with GNP per head up 2.9-fold between 1968 and 1982. Its Ministry of Health reported in 1988 that living standards had risen as income, housing, electricity, safe water and roads improved.

    [12]Economic development in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza district: report submitted by Israel to the United Nations(opens another site in a new tab)[18]Health in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza 1987–1988, report by Israel’s Ministry of Health to the World Health Assembly(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Factual claim

    A World Bank economist found that income per head in the territories converged with Israel’s, with “rapid convergence in GDP per capita (from 1968 to the mid-eighties)”.

    [16]Sébastien Dessus (World Bank), “A Palestinian Growth History, 1968-2000”, Journal of Economic Integration 19(3)(opens another site in a new tab)
  3. Position ·Israeli government

    Before 1967, Israel reported, electricity in the West Bank and Gaza had been “limited and sporadic, based an small local generators”.

    [12]Economic development in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza district: report submitted by Israel to the United Nations(opens another site in a new tab)
  4. Factual claim

    The first Palestinian universities, among them Birzeit, An-Najah and Bethlehem, were founded under Israeli rule, “after Israel issued them permits”.

    [17]Abdalhadi Alijla and others, “The Politics of Palestinian Universities”(opens another site in a new tab)
  5. Interpretation

    Before the first intifada, Palestinians could enter Israel by day, worked there in large numbers, and saw their incomes, homes and services improve. That was the starting point the violence destroyed.

Point 3 of 7

What changed in movement, and when?

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

  1. Factual claim

    Israel began restricting movement years before the suicide bombings: it restricted the general exit permits in June 1989, revoked them in January 1991, during the Gulf War, and made closure general in March 1993. The World Bank counted 91 days of full closure in 1993; Human Rights Watch counted the suicide bombings in Israel from April 1994.

    [2]Closure(opens another site in a new tab)[19]Economic situation in the West Bank and Gaza – World Bank note(opens another site in a new tab)[5]Israel’s Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip(opens another site in a new tab)

Argued in support of Israel’s position

  1. Factual claim

    The restrictions came with the uprising: the first intifada began in 1987, and the first restrictions on exit permits came in 1989. The general closure of 1993 followed attacks: it reached its peak “in March 1993, following the killing of nine Israeli civilians and six security forces' personnel”, and Human Rights Watch dates it to “a series of stabbings inside Israel”. Afterwards, “after incidents of Palestinian violence against Israelis”, Israel imposed total closures.

    [3]A Raw Deal: Abuses of Thai Workers in Israel’s Agricultural Sector(opens another site in a new tab)[2]Closure(opens another site in a new tab)[5]Israel’s Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip(opens another site in a new tab)

Point 4 of 7

What violence came before or with each change?

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

  1. Factual claim

    From September 2000 to the end of 2005, B’Tselem counted 3,386 Palestinians killed, 676 of them children and 1,815 not taking part in fighting when killed, and 992 Israelis killed, 118 of them children and 683 civilians.

    [8]197 Palestinians and 50 Israelis killed in 2005 (press release)(opens another site in a new tab)

Argued in support of Israel’s position

  1. Factual claim

    Human Rights Watch recorded four suicide bombings in February and March 1996, “within the span of nine days”, after eight others since April 1994 that killed at least sixty-six people. Nearly 300 Israelis were killed in attacks from the Oslo Accords to September 2000, and about 1,100 more from September 2000 to the end of 2005.

    [5]Israel’s Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip(opens another site in a new tab)[20]Comprehensive Listing of Terrorism Victims in Israel(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Position ·Human Rights Watch

    Human Rights Watch called Israel’s security concerns “real and substantial”.

    [5]Israel’s Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip(opens another site in a new tab)

Point 5 of 7

Did the restrictions follow the violence, or also serve other purposes?

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

  1. Factual claim

    The Oslo Accords “had almost no effect on these restrictions”. Israel also “often imposed a total closure on the Occupied Territories during Israeli holidays”. MERIP counted 443 days of closure between 1994 and 1999.

    [2]Closure(opens another site in a new tab)[21]“Under Siege”(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Position ·Human Rights Watch

    Human Rights Watch, while calling Israel’s security concerns “real and substantial”, found in 1996 that the closure policies “go beyond the legitimate security steps permissible under international law, by adopting means that adversely affect the welfare of the population and seek to punish individuals who themselves pose no security threat”.

    [5]Israel’s Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip(opens another site in a new tab)
  3. Interpretation

    The violence was real, but it does not explain a closure that began before the suicide bombings, continued through the Oslo years and on holidays, and fell on a whole population for the acts of a few. Closure became a permanent way of controlling the territories.

Argued in support of Israel’s position

  1. Interpretation

    The restrictions came with the uprisings and the attacks. No state lets people cross freely into its cities when some of them come to kill; closures on holidays, when attacks were feared, were security measures too. The permits, closures and checkpoints were the price of the stabbings and the suicide bombings, not their cause.

  2. Factual claim

    The World Bank, while finding closure the proximate cause of the Palestinian crisis of 2000–2003, recorded that Israel’s government viewed the restrictions “as essential to protect their citizens from violence”. In 2005 OCHA counted 605 closure obstacles in the West Bank in early 2005 and 376 on 1 August 2005.

    [22]Twenty-Seven Months – Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment(opens another site in a new tab)[23]Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access: closure update, August 2005(opens another site in a new tab)
  3. Position ·MERIP

    MERIP, a critic of the closure, wrote that Israel “has usually imposed such total closure whenever it perceived the threat of extremist attacks”.

    [21]“Under Siege”(opens another site in a new tab)
  4. Interpretation

    The restrictions moved with the threat: tightened after attacks, eased in calmer periods such as 2005. That is what security measures do.

Point 6 of 7

What did the barrier do?

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

  1. Factual claim

    The UN found in 2008 that about 87 per cent of the barrier’s route “runs inside the West Bank and East Jerusalem, rather than along the 1949 Armistice Line”. B’Tselem reported in 2006 that the route would isolate 9.5 per cent of the West Bank and directly harm 490,500 Palestinians.

    [10]The Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier, July 2008(opens another site in a new tab)[8]197 Palestinians and 50 Israelis killed in 2005 (press release)(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Interpretation

    A wall built only for security could have followed the Green Line. Built inside the West Bank and across villages’ land, it took land and cut Palestinians off from their fields, schools and each other.

Argued in support of Israel’s position

  1. Position ·Israeli government

    Israel’s Foreign Ministry said in its statement on the International Court of Justice hearing in 2004 that where the fence had been built, it “has already brought down suicide attacks by some 30%”, and that no suicide bomber had crossed the fence around Gaza.

    [13]Statement by Israel’s Foreign Ministry on the International Court of Justice hearing on the security fence (Daniel Taub, 23 February 2004)(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Position ·Washington Institute

    The Washington Institute reported that in the first half of 2004 the army foiled every suicide attack from the northern West Bank, and judged the fence “succeeding in its main objective”.

    [24]Israel’s Security Fence: Effective in Reducing Suicide Attacks from the Northern West Bank(opens another site in a new tab)
  3. Interpretation

    The fence saved lives. Its route is a security decision that can be reviewed and changed; the dead cannot be brought back.

Point 7 of 7

How did work, income and daily life change, and what caused it?

The bodies that measured the economy at the time, notably the World Bank, attribute the decline after 2000 mainly to closure; the two sides disagree less on that than on why the closures were imposed, which is the previous point.

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

  1. Position ·B’Tselem

    B’Tselem attributes the decline of the Oslo years principally to Israel’s closure policy. Palestinian employment in Israel fell from some 30 per cent of the workforce in 1992 to seven per cent in 1996, and real GNP fell 20 per cent from the end of 1992 to the end of 1997; when Israel imposed no comprehensive closure in 1998 and 1999, the economy “recovered somewhat”.

    [25]The Palestinian economy during the period of the Oslo Accords: 1994-2000(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Factual claim

    The World Bank found jobs in Israel lost also “due to increases in the number of foreign workers”.

    [19]Economic situation in the West Bank and Gaza – World Bank note(opens another site in a new tab)
  3. Factual claim

    The World Bank found that closure was “the proximate cause of the Palestinian economic crisis” after 2000: income losses reached $5.2 billion in 27 months; it reported in March 2003 that real income per head had halved since September 2000, and in November 2004 that some 47 per cent of Palestinians lived below the poverty line. In 2005 B’Tselem counted 27 permanent staffed checkpoints inside the West Bank.

    [22]Twenty-Seven Months – Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment(opens another site in a new tab)[26]World Bank: Two years of intifada, closures and Palestinian economic crisis (summary)(opens another site in a new tab)[27]World Bank: Palestinian economy remains depressed (press release)(opens another site in a new tab)[8]197 Palestinians and 50 Israelis killed in 2005 (press release)(opens another site in a new tab)
  4. Interpretation

    The collapse was the work of closure, as the bodies that measured it say. When the restrictions eased, as in 1998 and 1999, the economy recovered somewhat; when they tightened after 2000, it collapsed.

Argued in support of Israel’s position

  1. Factual claim

    After the first intifada began in 1987, the Israeli government restricted the number of Palestinians allowed to work in Israel. The uprising “created a shortage of labor in low-status positions”, and the recruitment of foreign workers followed from 1993.

    [3]A Raw Deal: Abuses of Thai Workers in Israel’s Agricultural Sector(opens another site in a new tab)[4]Adriana Kemp, “Labor Migration in Israel: The Creation of a Non-free Workforce”(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Interpretation

    The jobs and income Palestinians lost were, above all, the cost of the violence that made the restrictions necessary. Foreign workers came because Palestinian workers could no longer come.

Sources

  1. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion, with separate opinions and declarations (opens another site)International Court of Justice, published by the United Nations
  2. Closure (opens another site)B'Tselem
  3. A Raw Deal: Abuses of Thai Workers in Israel’s Agricultural Sector (opens another site)Human Rights Watch
  4. Adriana Kemp, “Labor Migration in Israel: The Creation of a Non-free Workforce” (opens another site)Tel Aviv University
  5. Israel’s Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (opens another site)Human Rights Watch
  6. Text of mutual recognition letters (Arafat to Rabin) (opens another site)Jewish Telegraphic Agency
  7. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (opens another site)Uppsala Conflict Data Program (text of the agreement)
  8. 197 Palestinians and 50 Israelis killed in 2005 (press release) (opens another site)B'Tselem
  9. Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le territoire palestinien occupé : avis consultatif (document A/ES-10/273) (opens another site)Cour internationale de Justice, publié par les Nations Unies
  10. The Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier, July 2008 (opens another site)UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), via UNISPAL
  11. The Palestinian economy: 1967-1994 (opens another site)B'Tselem
  12. Economic development in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza district: report submitted by Israel to the United Nations (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)
  13. Statement by Israel’s Foreign Ministry on the International Court of Justice hearing on the security fence (Daniel Taub, 23 February 2004) (opens another site)Jewish Virtual Library
  14. Fadle Naqib, “The Palestinian Economy: Dependence on Israel and Prospects for Integration with the Arab World” (working paper) (opens another site)Economic Research Forum
  15. Countering economic dependence and de-development in the occupied Palestinian territory (opens another site)UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (via UNISPAL)
  16. Sébastien Dessus (World Bank), “A Palestinian Growth History, 1968-2000”, Journal of Economic Integration 19(3) (opens another site)Journal of Economic Integration
  17. Abdalhadi Alijla and others, “The Politics of Palestinian Universities” (opens another site)Arab Center Washington DC
  18. Health in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza 1987–1988, report by Israel’s Ministry of Health to the World Health Assembly (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)
  19. Economic situation in the West Bank and Gaza – World Bank note (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)
  20. Comprehensive Listing of Terrorism Victims in Israel (opens another site)Jewish Virtual Library
  21. “Under Siege” (opens another site)Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)
  22. Twenty-Seven Months – Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment (opens another site)World Bank
  23. Implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access: closure update, August 2005 (opens another site)UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
  24. Israel’s Security Fence: Effective in Reducing Suicide Attacks from the Northern West Bank (opens another site)Washington Institute for Near East Policy
  25. The Palestinian economy during the period of the Oslo Accords: 1994-2000 (opens another site)B'Tselem
  26. World Bank: Two years of intifada, closures and Palestinian economic crisis (summary) (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)
  27. World Bank: Palestinian economy remains depressed (press release) (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)

All the sources this site uses →

Change history

  • Human Rights Watch’s judgement on Israel’s security concerns and MERIP’s statement on closures shown as their positions, apart from the counts (a7, a17, a9, a18).
  • Statements reporting what a government, an organisation, a scholar or a witness says are now shown as that speaker’s position, with the speaker named; statements quoting two speakers are split in two.
  • Added a background box with the main dates, from the 1967 war to the barrier Israel began building in 2002.
  • Added a note on the evidence under the point on how work, income and daily life changed.
  • B’Tselem is now introduced as an Israeli human rights organisation.
  • First publications.