Israeli–Palestinian conflict · Chapter 2 · The 1948 war and the exodus · question 1 of 2

Why did hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs leave their homes in 1947–1949: were they mainly expelled, or did they mainly flee?

Last reviewed

Background · 9 key momentsHow the war unfoldedNew to the subject? Start here.
  1. 29 November 1947

    The UN General Assembly recommended dividing Palestine, then under British Mandate, into a Jewish state and an Arab state, with Jerusalem under international rule. [1]United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), Future Government of Palestine(opens another site in a new tab)

  2. December 1947–spring 1948

    The Arab Higher Committee rejected the partition plan, and violence spread. In February 1948 a UN commission reported that “powerful Arab interests” were “engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force” the settlement, and also recorded “loss of life and damage to property caused by Jewish reprisals”. [2]United Nations Palestine Commission, First Special Report to the Security Council: The Problem of Security in Palestine (A/AC.21/9)(opens another site in a new tab)

  3. 9 April 1948

    Fighters of the Irgun and the Stern Group attacked the village of Deir Yassin, near Jerusalem; reports of a massacre of villagers, including women and children, spread. [3]Palestine (Outrages), House of Commons debate, 12 April 1948, vol. 449 cc626–30(opens another site in a new tab)

  4. 14 May 1948

    As the British Mandate ended, the leaders of the Jewish community declared the State of Israel. [4]Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel(opens another site in a new tab)

  5. 15 May 1948

    The armies of neighbouring Arab states entered Palestine; the Arab League told the UN that the Arab governments were “compelled to intervene”. [5]Cablegram dated 15 May 1948 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (S/745)(opens another site in a new tab)

  6. June–July 1948

    Israel’s cabinet decided to prevent the refugees’ return while the fighting continued; in July, Israeli forces drove between 50,000 and 60,000 inhabitants from Lydda and Ramle. [6]Benny Morris, “Deciding against a return of the refugees, April–December 1948”, in The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited(opens another site in a new tab)[7]Benny Morris, “In ’48, Israel Did What It Had to Do”(opens another site in a new tab)

  7. 11 December 1948

    The UN General Assembly resolved that refugees “wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date”, with compensation for those choosing not to return. [8]General Assembly resolution 194 (III), Palestine: Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator(opens another site in a new tab)[9]Résolution 194 (III) de l’Assemblée générale, reproduite dans « Le droit de retour du peuple palestinien » (ST/SG/SER.F/2)(opens another site in a new tab)

  8. February–July 1949

    Israel signed armistice agreements with Egypt (24 February), Lebanon (23 March), Jordan (3 April) and Syria (20 July). [10]Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement(opens another site in a new tab)[11]Lebanese-Israeli General Armistice Agreement(opens another site in a new tab)[12]Jordanian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement(opens another site in a new tab)[13]Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement(opens another site in a new tab)

  9. November 1949

    A UN mission estimated the number of refugees at 726,000; Israel’s own count was not more than 520,000. [14]First Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (Clapp report)(opens another site in a new tab)[15]Israeli reply to the Committee’s questionnaire on refugees and broken families, UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Technical Committee on Refugees(opens another site in a new tab)

In brief

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

Most were driven out, by expulsion and by the terror of attacks, in a war that cleared the land of its Arab majority, and Israel then barred their return.

The Nakba was the outcome of decades in which Zionist leaders discussed the transfer of the Arabs, and of a war plan, Plan Dalet, that provided for destroying villages and expelling their people, and whose orders to each brigade listed villages to be occupied and emptied. Israel’s own intelligence found in June 1948 that Jewish military action caused some 70 per cent of the departures up to then, and Arab orders very few. At Lydda and Ramle, in July, the army ordered the expulsion of tens of thousands. Deir Yassin and the fear it spread were part of how the land was emptied. No general call to leave has been found; many calls told them to stay. Then Israel decided not to let them come back, took their houses, and passed a law vesting their property in the state.

Where this is argued: [16]Nur Masalha, “Israel’s Moral Responsibility Towards the Palestinian Refugees”(opens another site in a new tab)[17]Rashid Khalidi, “Fifty Years After 1948: A Universal Jubilee?”(opens another site in a new tab)

Argued in support of Israel’s position

Most Arabs fled a war their own side started; there was no policy to expel them, and their return was refused while the Arab states stayed at war.

The Arab Higher Committee rejected the UN partition plan of November 1947, and a UN commission reported in February 1948 a deliberate Arab effort “to alter by force” the settlement; the Arab states joined the war in May 1948. The flight was the result of a war the Arab side brought on. Plan Dalet was a military plan to hold the territory of the Jewish state and its roads; where villages resisted it allowed their removal, where they did not it left them under garrison. Historians who have read the archives, Benny Morris among them, find no master plan to expel the Arabs, and conclude that most fled out of fear or on their leaders’ advice. In Haifa the Arab Higher Committee ordered the remaining Arabs out while the Jewish leadership urged them to stay. Expulsions happened, at Lydda and Ramle above all, for military reasons in the middle of a war. Return was refused because a hostile population could not be readmitted while the Arab states remained at war, and Israel offered to settle the question as part of peace.

Where this is argued: [18]The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of State, conveying Israel’s position, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, vol. V, part 2, document 487(opens another site in a new tab)[19]Efraim Karsh, “Reclaiming a historical truth” (first published in Haaretz)(opens another site in a new tab)

What it turns on: The sources on this page show that some towns and villages were emptied by order, that others were left as fighting reached or neared them, that Israel’s own intelligence counted 391,000 people displaced by 1 June 1948, two weeks after the Arab states entered the war, and attributed most of those departures to Jewish military action, that Arab orders to leave played a part in some places, and that Israel decided from June 1948 not to let the refugees return. The sides disagree on which causes weighed most over the whole war, on whether the expulsions amounted to a policy, on why return was refused, and on who bears responsibility for the war in which it all happened.

A note on terms

Palestinians call the events of 1948 the Nakba, “the catastrophe”; in Israel the war is the War of Independence. On this page each side’s column uses its own term, and the site says “the 1948 war”. The war had two phases: fighting between Jewish and Arab communities under the British Mandate from the end of November 1947, and war between Israel and the Arab states from 15 May 1948, when the Arab governments announced that they would “intervene”. [20]The Historiography of the 1948 Wars(opens another site in a new tab)[21]Benny Morris, “The New Historiography: Israel Confronts Its Past”, in Making Israel(opens another site in a new tab)[5]Cablegram dated 15 May 1948 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (S/745)(opens another site in a new tab)

On this page, “expelled” means ordered to leave or removed by force. “Fled” means left without being ordered out: out of fear of fighting, at the urging of leaders, or as fighting reached a place. Whether leaving under attack is flight or being driven out is part of what the two sides dispute. Historians on both sides also describe pressure short of expulsion, such as attacks on nearby villages, rumours, and psychological warfare; where a statement concerns that, it says so.

The number of refugees was disputed from the start. In 1949 Israel put it at no more than 520,000, a UN economic mission at 726,000, and a UN technical committee at about 711,000. The Palestinian historian Rashid Khalidi gives about 750,000. Counts of the villages emptied also differ with what each list includes: Walid Khalidi’s survey identifies 418 villages, and Benny Morris’s list, based mainly on Israeli archives, 369 localities; 70 per cent of Walid Khalidi’s villages appear in every other list. Each figure on this page says whose it is and when it was given. [15]Israeli reply to the Committee’s questionnaire on refugees and broken families, UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Technical Committee on Refugees(opens another site in a new tab)[14]First Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (Clapp report)(opens another site in a new tab)[22]Report of the Technical Committee on refugees, UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine(opens another site in a new tab)[23]Palestinian Villages Depopulated in 1948: A Comparison of Sources (appendix to Walid Khalidi, ed., All That Remains)(opens another site in a new tab)[17]Rashid Khalidi, “Fifty Years After 1948: A Universal Jubilee?”(opens another site in a new tab)

Point by point

Point 1 of 6

How many left, and from where?

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

  1. Factual claim

    A UN mission put the number of refugees at 726,000 in November 1949, and a UN technical committee at about 711,000. Walid Khalidi’s survey of the villages depopulated in 1948, All That Remains, identifies 418 villages.

    [14]First Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (Clapp report)(opens another site in a new tab)[22]Report of the Technical Committee on refugees, UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine(opens another site in a new tab)[23]Palestinian Villages Depopulated in 1948: A Comparison of Sources (appendix to Walid Khalidi, ed., All That Remains)(opens another site in a new tab)

Argued in support of Israel’s position

  1. Position ·Israeli government

    Israel told the UN Conciliation Commission in July 1949 that, by its experts’ count, the number of Arab refugees from its territory “would be not more than 520,000”.

    [15]Israeli reply to the Committee’s questionnaire on refugees and broken families, UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Technical Committee on Refugees(opens another site in a new tab)

Point 2 of 6

Was there a plan or policy to remove the Arab population?

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

  1. Position ·Yosef Weitz

    Yosef Weitz, a senior official of the Jewish National Fund, wrote in his diary in December 1940: “The only way is to transfer the Arabs from here to neighbouring countries.”

    [16]Nur Masalha, “Israel’s Moral Responsibility Towards the Palestinian Refugees”(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Position ·Nur Masalha

    The historian Nur Masalha documents secret discussions of transfer in the Zionist movement’s leading bodies from 1937 to 1948.

    [16]Nur Masalha, “Israel’s Moral Responsibility Towards the Palestinian Refugees”(opens another site in a new tab)
  3. Factual claim

    Plan Dalet provides for the destruction of villages, especially those “difficult to control continuously”, and orders that where a searched village resists, its armed force be destroyed and “the population must be expelled outside the borders of the state”. For towns, it orders that in case of resistance in the neighbourhoods between the Jewish and Arab centres, “the population will be expelled to the area of the Arab municipal center”.

    [24]Plan Dalet (March 10, 1948)(opens another site in a new tab)[25]Text of Plan Dalet (Plan D), General Section(opens another site in a new tab)
  4. Interpretation

    In Ilan Pappé’s reading, Plan Dalet turned the long-discussed idea of transfer into orders for each brigade, with lists of villages to be occupied and emptied. Walid Khalidi called it a “master plan for the conquest of Palestine”, and Pappé reads it as a plan for ethnic cleansing. The 1948 exodus was, in Masalha’s words, “the culmination of over half a century of Zionist efforts, secret plans and brute force”.

    [20]The Historiography of the 1948 Wars(opens another site in a new tab)[16]Nur Masalha, “Israel’s Moral Responsibility Towards the Palestinian Refugees”(opens another site in a new tab)
  5. Factual claim

    The same UN mission counted 726,000 Arab refugees. It reported that the Jewish refugees “entered into Israel where most of them have now been absorbed”, while the Arab refugees could not return “because Israel will not admit them”.

    [14]First Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (Clapp report)(opens another site in a new tab)

Argued in support of Israel’s position

  1. Factual claim

    Plan Dalet, the Haganah’s plan of March 1948, states that its objective “is to gain control of the areas of the Hebrew state and defend its borders”. For Arab villages it orders that, in the event of resistance, “the population must be expelled outside the borders of the state”, and that “in the absence of resistance, garrison troops will enter the village” and take up positions in it.

    [24]Plan Dalet (March 10, 1948)(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Position ·Benny Morris

    The historian Benny Morris concluded that the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, “did not enter the 1948 war with a master plan for expelling the Arabs”, and that the idea of transfer “never crystallized into a formal Zionist policy”.

    [21]Benny Morris, “The New Historiography: Israel Confronts Its Past”, in Making Israel(opens another site in a new tab)[7]Benny Morris, “In ’48, Israel Did What It Had to Do”(opens another site in a new tab)
  3. Interpretation

    Plan Dalet was a military plan for holding the territory and roads of the Jewish state against the coming invasion. Its measures against villages, destruction included, were aimed at places that could serve as bases for armed forces; villages that did not resist were to be garrisoned, not emptied. That is the opposite of a plan to clear the country of its Arabs.

    [26]“No More Tears”, review of Benny Morris’s work, quoting Morris(opens another site in a new tab)[24]Plan Dalet (March 10, 1948)(opens another site in a new tab)
  4. Factual claim

    The UN economic mission reported in November 1949 that “some seventeen thousand Jewish refugees, too, fled from their homes in and around Jerusalem and territories on the Arab side of the armistice lines”.

    [14]First Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (Clapp report)(opens another site in a new tab)

Point 3 of 6

Where were people expelled, and where did they flee?

The main documentary evidence on why people left comes from Israel’s own archives, such as its military intelligence report of June 1948, which the Palestinian side cites; Israel’s side relies more on historians’ overall judgments and on the Arab states’ role in the war.

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

  1. Factual claim

    Israel’s military intelligence concluded in a report of 30 June 1948, covering the departures up to 1 June, that “at least 55% of the overall migration movement was motivated by our actions and their impact”, and attributed about 15 per cent more to the Irgun and Lehi, which it called the “Dissidents”: “some 70%” in all. It counted 391,000 people displaced by then.

    [27]Migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs between December 1, 1947 and June 1, 1948 (IDF Intelligence Service, Arab Section; English translation published by Akevot)(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Factual claim

    On 12 July 1948 Lieutenant Colonel Yitzhak Rabin, operations officer of Operation Dani, ordered: “The inhabitants of Lydda must be expelled quickly without attention to age.” Between 50,000 and 60,000 inhabitants of Lydda and Ramle were driven out over two days. In a passage of his memoirs that Israel’s censors removed, made public in 1979, Rabin wrote that Ben-Gurion, asked what to do with the population, “waved his hand in a gesture which said, ‘Drive them out’”. Yigal Allon, the operation’s commander, replied: “Ben Gurion gave no such order. I gave no such order and there was no such order.”

    [21]Benny Morris, “The New Historiography: Israel Confronts Its Past”, in Making Israel(opens another site in a new tab)[7]Benny Morris, “In ’48, Israel Did What It Had to Do”(opens another site in a new tab)[28]Allon Brands As Totally False Account of Expulsion of Arabs in 1948 War(opens another site in a new tab)
  3. Interpretation

    People who leave as their village is attacked, or because the next village fell, have not chosen to go. Expulsion orders, attacks and fear worked together, and the result was the same: the land was emptied of most of its Arab inhabitants.

Argued in support of Israel’s position

  1. Factual claim

    In February 1948 the UN Palestine Commission reported that the Arab Higher Committee was “determined to persist in its rejection of the partition plan”, and that “Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein.”

    [2]United Nations Palestine Commission, First Special Report to the Security Council: The Problem of Security in Palestine (A/AC.21/9)(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Position ·Arab League

    On 15 May 1948 the Arab League told the UN Secretary-General that the Arab governments were “compelled to intervene” in Palestine.

    [5]Cablegram dated 15 May 1948 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (S/745)(opens another site in a new tab)
  3. Position ·Walter Eytan

    In May 1949 Walter Eytan, head of Israel’s delegation, wrote to the UN Conciliation Commission, as summarised in a US telegram, that “Important Arab Delegates understand war which their governments brought to Palestine had much of evil aftermath they must have been able to foresee.”

    [29]The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State, reporting Walter Eytan’s letter to the Conciliation Commission, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol. VI, document 700(opens another site in a new tab)
  4. Position ·Benny Morris

    Morris wrote in 2004 that “most fled because they feared the ravages of war or because they were advised to do so by their leaders”.

    [7]Benny Morris, “In ’48, Israel Did What It Had to Do”(opens another site in a new tab)
  5. Position ·Yoav Gelber

    The historian Yoav Gelber writes that “during the civil war the Palestinians were not expelled; they simply ran away”.

    [30]Yoav Gelber, “The Israeli-Arab War of 1948”, in Israel Studies: An Anthology(opens another site in a new tab)
  6. Position ·Efraim Karsh

    Efraim Karsh, in his history of the war, accepts that some Palestinian Arabs were driven out by Jewish forces, with “the only large-scale incidents taking place in the towns of Lod and Ramle”, which he says were expelled on grounds of military necessity.

    [31]David Rodman, review of Efraim Karsh, Palestine Betrayed(opens another site in a new tab)
  7. Interpretation

    Most Arabs left a war their side had started, as civilians leave war zones everywhere. The expulsions that did happen, even where they were approved from above, were military decisions taken in the course of battle, not the execution of a plan.

Point 4 of 6

Did Arab leaders tell people to leave, or to stay?

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

  1. Position ·Walid Khalidi and Erskine Childers

    Walid Khalidi and the Irish diplomat and journalist Erskine Childers found no trace of calls to leave in the communiqués of the Arab Higher Committee or the Arab League, or in the BBC’s recordings of Arab and Jewish broadcasts. Khalidi found many calls to stay: in April and May 1948 the Arab Higher Committee and town committees broadcast appeals to officials to remain at their posts.

    [20]The Historiography of the 1948 Wars(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Factual claim

    Israel’s intelligence report of June 1948 lists orders by Arab bodies among the causes of departure, and says their impact “amounts to some 5% of all villages having been evacuated for this reason”.

    [27]Migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs between December 1, 1947 and June 1, 1948 (IDF Intelligence Service, Arab Section; English translation published by Akevot)(opens another site in a new tab)

Argued in support of Israel’s position

  1. Position ·Efraim Karsh

    In his study of Haifa, Karsh found that half of the city’s Arab community left before the battle of April 1948, and that 15,000 to 25,000 more were ordered to leave, “almost certainly on the instructions of the Arab Higher Committee”, while the city’s Jewish leadership and the Haganah tried to persuade them to stay.

    [32]Efraim Karsh, “Nakbat Haifa: the collapse and dispersion of a major Palestinian Community” (abstract)(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Position ·Israeli government

    Israel’s government told the United States in July 1948 that the impulse of Arab civilians to leave the war areas “was deliberately fostered by Arab leaders for political motives”.

    [18]The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of State, conveying Israel’s position, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, vol. V, part 2, document 487(opens another site in a new tab)
  3. Position ·Efraim Karsh

    The historian Efraim Karsh writes that “large numbers” of Palestinian Arabs “were driven from their homes by their own leaders”.

    [19]Efraim Karsh, “Reclaiming a historical truth” (first published in Haaretz)(opens another site in a new tab)

Point 5 of 6

What part did fear and atrocities play?

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

  1. Factual claim

    Britain’s Colonial Secretary was asked in Parliament on 12 April 1948 about “reports of a widespread massacre of the villagers including many women and children” at Deir Yassin. Israel’s intelligence report of June 1948 says that Deir Yassin “had a particular impact on the Arab psyche” and calls it a decisive catalyst of flight. It also lists “Jewish Whispering operations” intended to make Arabs flee.

    [3]Palestine (Outrages), House of Commons debate, 12 April 1948, vol. 449 cc626–30(opens another site in a new tab)[27]Migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs between December 1, 1947 and June 1, 1948 (IDF Intelligence Service, Arab Section; English translation published by Akevot)(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Interpretation

    Terror was part of how the land was emptied. A massacre, and the rumours and warnings that followed it, did what expulsion orders did elsewhere, and the result was used rather than undone.

Argued in support of Israel’s position

  1. Factual claim

    The Irgun claimed responsibility for the killings at Deir Yassin in April 1948, carried out with the Stern Group (Lehi); Israel’s intelligence called both groups “Dissidents”. The Jewish Agency, the leadership of the Jewish community, made a public statement “condemning this outrage”.

    [3]Palestine (Outrages), House of Commons debate, 12 April 1948, vol. 449 cc626–30(opens another site in a new tab)[27]Migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs between December 1, 1947 and June 1, 1948 (IDF Intelligence Service, Arab Section; English translation published by Akevot)(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Interpretation

    Fear spread through a war the Arab side chose, and Deir Yassin was the act of groups the Jewish leadership condemned. Neither turns the flight into a policy of the Jewish state.

Point 6 of 6

Why did the refugees not return?

Argued in support of the Palestinian position

  1. Factual claim

    Israel’s cabinet reached a consensus in mid-June 1948 “to prevent a return, at least so long as the hostilities continued”, and made it a formal decision in July. A US consul reported in June 1948 that “Arabs who return Haifa are considered illegals.” A UN mission found in 1949 that the refugees could not return “because Israel will not admit them”.

    [6]Benny Morris, “Deciding against a return of the refugees, April–December 1948”, in The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited(opens another site in a new tab)[33]The Consul at Haifa (Lippincott) to the Secretary of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, vol. V, part 2, document 402(opens another site in a new tab)[14]First Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (Clapp report)(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Position ·Israeli government

    Israel told the UN Conciliation Commission in 1949 that it “took advantage of vacant houses”, and that Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle, Beersheba and Safed were almost wholly occupied by Jewish residents.

    [29]The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State, reporting Walter Eytan’s letter to the Conciliation Commission, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol. VI, document 700(opens another site in a new tab)
  3. Factual claim

    The Absentees’ Property Law of 1950 vested in a state Custodian the property of any Palestinian citizen who had left his place of residence for a place outside Palestine before September 1948, or for an area held by forces fighting Israel.

    [34]Absentees’ Property Law, 5710-1950(opens another site in a new tab)
  4. Interpretation

    Whatever made each family leave, the refusal of return is what kept them refugees. Barring return, taking the houses and vesting the property in the state completed what the war began.

Argued in support of Israel’s position

  1. Position ·Israeli government

    Israel told the United States in July 1948 that return “can only be considered as part of a permanent peace settlement with the Arab states”, that it was meanwhile allowed in individual cases, and that any settlement would take into account “the position and treatment of Jewish minorities in the Arab countries”.

    [18]The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of State, conveying Israel’s position, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, vol. V, part 2, document 487(opens another site in a new tab)
  2. Factual claim

    In 1949 a UN mission recorded that Israel had offered to take back 100,000 refugees as part of a general peace settlement, and that “No settlement has been reached.”

    [14]First Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (Clapp report)(opens another site in a new tab)
  3. Interpretation

    Readmitting, in the middle of a war, a population whose leaders and neighbouring states were fighting Israel was a risk no government could accept. Israel tied return to peace, and peace did not come. And the refugees’ fate cannot be settled apart from that of the Jews of the Arab countries, as Israel said from 1948.

Sources

  1. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), Future Government of Palestine (opens another site)Avalon Project, Yale Law School
  2. United Nations Palestine Commission, First Special Report to the Security Council: The Problem of Security in Palestine (A/AC.21/9) (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)
  3. Palestine (Outrages), House of Commons debate, 12 April 1948, vol. 449 cc626–30 (opens another site)UK Parliament (Hansard)
  4. Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel (opens another site)Avalon Project, Yale Law School
  5. Cablegram dated 15 May 1948 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (S/745) (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)
  6. Benny Morris, “Deciding against a return of the refugees, April–December 1948”, in The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (opens another site)Cambridge University Press
  7. Benny Morris, “In ’48, Israel Did What It Had to Do” (opens another site)Los Angeles Times
  8. General Assembly resolution 194 (III), Palestine: Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)
  9. Résolution 194 (III) de l’Assemblée générale, reproduite dans « Le droit de retour du peuple palestinien » (ST/SG/SER.F/2) (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)
  10. Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement (opens another site)Avalon Project, Yale Law School
  11. Lebanese-Israeli General Armistice Agreement (opens another site)Avalon Project, Yale Law School
  12. Jordanian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement (opens another site)Avalon Project, Yale Law School
  13. Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement (opens another site)Avalon Project, Yale Law School
  14. First Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (Clapp report) (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)
  15. Israeli reply to the Committee’s questionnaire on refugees and broken families, UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Technical Committee on Refugees (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)
  16. Nur Masalha, “Israel’s Moral Responsibility Towards the Palestinian Refugees” (opens another site)PLO Negotiations Affairs Department
  17. Rashid Khalidi, “Fifty Years After 1948: A Universal Jubilee?” (opens another site)Palestine-Israel Journal
  18. The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of State, conveying Israel’s position, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, vol. V, part 2, document 487 (opens another site)Office of the Historian, US Department of State
  19. Efraim Karsh, “Reclaiming a historical truth” (first published in Haaretz) (opens another site)Middle East Forum
  20. The Historiography of the 1948 Wars (opens another site)Mass Violence and Resistance research network, Sciences Po
  21. Benny Morris, “The New Historiography: Israel Confronts Its Past”, in Making Israel (opens another site)University of Michigan Press
  22. Report of the Technical Committee on refugees, UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)
  23. Palestinian Villages Depopulated in 1948: A Comparison of Sources (appendix to Walid Khalidi, ed., All That Remains) (opens another site)Interactive Encyclopedia of the Palestine Question, Institute for Palestine Studies
  24. Plan Dalet (March 10, 1948) (opens another site)Jewish Virtual Library
  25. Text of Plan Dalet (Plan D), General Section (opens another site)Interactive Encyclopedia of the Palestine Question, Institute for Palestine Studies
  26. “No More Tears”, review of Benny Morris’s work, quoting Morris (opens another site)Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)
  27. Migration of Eretz Yisrael Arabs between December 1, 1947 and June 1, 1948 (IDF Intelligence Service, Arab Section; English translation published by Akevot) (opens another site)Akevot Institute for Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Research
  28. Allon Brands As Totally False Account of Expulsion of Arabs in 1948 War (opens another site)Jewish Telegraphic Agency
  29. The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State, reporting Walter Eytan’s letter to the Conciliation Commission, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol. VI, document 700 (opens another site)Office of the Historian, US Department of State
  30. Yoav Gelber, “The Israeli-Arab War of 1948”, in Israel Studies: An Anthology (opens another site)Jewish Virtual Library
  31. David Rodman, review of Efraim Karsh, Palestine Betrayed (opens another site)Middle East Quarterly (Middle East Forum)
  32. Efraim Karsh, “Nakbat Haifa: the collapse and dispersion of a major Palestinian Community” (abstract) (opens another site)King’s College London
  33. The Consul at Haifa (Lippincott) to the Secretary of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, vol. V, part 2, document 402 (opens another site)Office of the Historian, US Department of State
  34. Absentees’ Property Law, 5710-1950 (opens another site)United Nations (UNISPAL)

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Change history

  • The timing of the departures, raised by a reader: the page's overview now says that Israel's intelligence counted 391,000 people displaced by 1 June 1948, two weeks after the Arab states entered the war; the Israeli column's summary now dates the war as its advocates do, from the Arab Higher Committee's rejection of the UN partition plan in November 1947, with a new statement giving the UN Palestine Commission's report of February 1948.
  • The note on figures now gives the counts of villages emptied: Walid Khalidi’s survey identifies 418, Benny Morris’s list, based mainly on Israeli archives, 369 localities; 70 per cent of Khalidi’s villages appear in every other list.
  • The Palestinian summary now describes Plan Dalet as its statements do: it provided for destroying villages and expelling their people, and its orders to each brigade listed villages to be occupied and emptied.
  • Khalidi and Childers’s finding (b8) and Israel’s statement to the Conciliation Commission (b13) shown as positions; the Absentees’ Property Law is now its own statement (b17).
  • Statements reporting what a government, an organisation, a scholar or a witness says are now shown as that speaker’s position, with the speaker named; statements quoting two speakers are split in two.
  • Added two dates to the background box: the fighting from December 1947 to spring 1948, with a UN commission’s report on it, and the UN resolution of 11 December 1948 on the refugees’ return.
  • Added a background box with the main dates of the war, from the 1947 partition plan to the 1949 armistice agreements.
  • Added a note on the evidence under the point on where people were expelled and where they fled.
  • Added, on the question of a plan, the UN economic mission’s count of about 17,000 Jewish refugees from the Arab side of the lines in 1948, and its report that they were absorbed in Israel while the Arab refugees were not admitted back.
  • Revised copy.
  • First published.