Israeli–Palestinian conflict · Before you start

Why do Israelis and Palestinians read the same events so differently?

Last reviewed

Israelis and Palestinians often look at the same event and see different things. Researchers have identified several factors that can shape these readings in both societies; how much each matters varies from person to person. This page describes them. It does not judge which reading is better supported: the question pages compare each claim with its sources. Explaining why people believe something does not settle whether it is true, or who is responsible. The two peoples also live under different political and legal conditions, which this page does not describe. Explaining how each reads events does not mean treating their situations as the same, or their claims as equally well founded.

1948: one war, two commemorations

For most Jewish Israelis

Independence Day. Jewish Israelis celebrate the founding of the state, declared on 14 May 1948 in the name of what its Declaration calls “the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State”. The holiday follows the Hebrew date of the declaration, the fifth of Iyar, in April or May, and moves when it would fall too close to the Sabbath. Memorial Day for fallen soldiers always comes the day before.[1]Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 14 May 1948(opens another site in a new tab)[2]Yom HaAtzma’ut 1949(opens another site in a new tab)

For most Palestinians

Nakba Day. On 15 May, Palestinians commemorate the Nakba, the catastrophe: the displacement of hundreds of thousands in the 1948 war, by flight and expulsion, and the loss of their homes and villages.[3]Commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the Nakba(opens another site in a new tab)

Collective memory

Researchers describe dominant accounts of the past in each society, which not every member shares, and new events tend to be read against them. Writing about the accounts that sustain long conflicts in general, Daniel Bar-Tal and colleagues describe them as tending to be “biased in favor of the in-group, selective, distorting and simplistic.”[4]Daniel Bar-Tal, Neta Oren and Rafi Nets-Zehngut, “Sociopsychological analysis of conflict-supporting narratives: A general framework,” Journal of Peace Research(opens another site in a new tab)

Among Jewish Israelis

For many Jewish Israelis, the formative memories include persecution in Europe and the Middle East, the Holocaust, and the wars Israel has fought. An attack may then be read as evidence that the threat to Jewish survival has not passed.

Among Palestinians

For many Palestinians, the formative memories include the displacement and loss of homes in 1948, and Israeli rule over the West Bank and Gaza since 1967, which Palestinians, the United Nations and most states call occupation and Israeli governments dispute. A new displacement may then be read as a continuation of 1948.

ExampleWhere the story starts. The same war can be told from 7 October 2023, from 1967 or from 1948. Each starting point makes a different side the one that acted first.

Threat and suspicion

People tend to explain their own side’s violence and the other side’s differently. In a 2014 study of representative samples of Israelis and of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, each tended to “attribute their own group’s aggression to ingroup love more than outgroup hate,” and the other side’s aggression to hatred.[5]Adam Waytz, Liane L. Young and Jeremy Ginges, “Motive attribution asymmetry for love vs. hate drives intractable conflict,” PNAS(opens another site in a new tab)

Among Palestinians

In a joint poll taken in July 2024, during the war that began on 7 October 2023, 94% of Palestinians said Israeli Jews could not be trusted. Asked to score each people’s humanity out of 100, they gave Israeli Jews an average of 6, and their own people 88.[6]Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll, summary report (fieldwork 17–29 July 2024)(opens another site in a new tab)

Among Jewish Israelis

In the same poll, 86% of Israeli Jews said Palestinians could not be trusted. They gave Palestinians an average of 14 out of 100, and their own people 87.[6]Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll, summary report (fieldwork 17–29 July 2024)(opens another site in a new tab)

Arab citizens of Israel, polled separately. 64% said Israeli Jews could be trusted. On the same humanity scale, they gave Palestinians an average of 64 and Israeli Jews 54.[6]Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll, summary report (fieldwork 17–29 July 2024)(opens another site in a new tab)

ExampleSome issues are held as sacred. In experiments with Palestinian and Israeli participants, violent opposition to compromise over such issues was “increased by offering material incentives to compromise” but “decreased when the adversary makes symbolic compromises over their own sacred values.”[7]Jeremy Ginges, Scott Atran, Douglas Medin and Khalil Shikaki, “Sacred bounds on rational resolution of violent political conflict,” PNAS(opens another site in a new tab)

Whose suffering counts

Researchers call it competitive victimhood: the efforts of groups in violent conflict “to establish that their group has suffered more than their adversarial group,” which they argue can “contribute to conflicts’ escalation and impede their peaceful resolution.” Remembering suffering is not, by itself, competitive victimhood; it becomes so when one side’s losses are used to discount the other’s.[8]Masi Noor, Nurit Shnabel, Samer Halabi and Arie Nadler, “When Suffering Begets Suffering: The Psychology of Competitive Victimhood Between Adversarial Groups in Violent Conflicts,” Personality and Social Psychology Review(opens another site in a new tab)

Among Jewish Israelis

In the July 2024 joint poll, 84% of Israeli Jews agreed that the victimisation of their people “is the worst compared to other people that suffered from persecution and injustice.”[9]The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll: Press Release (fieldwork July 2024)(opens another site in a new tab)

Among Palestinians

In the same poll, 83% of Palestinians agreed with the same statement about their own people.[9]The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll: Press Release (fieldwork July 2024)(opens another site in a new tab)

Arab citizens of Israel, polled separately. 62% agreed with the statement about themselves.[9]The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll: Press Release (fieldwork July 2024)(opens another site in a new tab)

Names and their arguments

The same place or act often has two names, and each name carries an argument. The study cited here records which names are used in official and media sources; it does not measure what the names do to readers, and we found no study that does for these terms.

Among Palestinians

The Palestinian official term the study records for the barrier in the West Bank is “apartheid wall”: the name asserts that the barrier is a form of apartheid.[10]Richard Rogers and Anat Ben-David, “Coming to terms: a conflict analysis of the usage, in official and unofficial sources, of ‘security fence’, ‘apartheid wall’, and other terms for the structure between Israel and the Palestinian territories,” Media, War & Conflict(opens another site in a new tab)

Example1948: to Israelis, the War of Independence; to Palestinians, the Nakba, a name for the war’s outcome, the displacement, rather than for the war itself.

Schoolbooks

A 2013 study of Israeli and Palestinian schoolbooks, funded by the United States Department of State, found that dehumanising portrayals of the other “are rare in both Israeli and Palestinian books,” and that both present “unilateral national narratives” with little about the other side. It found differences between school systems: Israeli state-school books were “statistically significantly more positive” in their portrayal of the other than Israeli ultra-Orthodox books and Palestinian Authority books. Arabic books used in Israel’s Arab schools were not studied. The study is more than a decade old and covered textbooks only, not what children are taught outside them; later studies examined one side’s books at a time. The question page on what children are taught sets out what they found.[11]Bruce Wexler, Sami Adwan and Daniel Bar-Tal, “Victims of Our Own Narratives? Portrayal of the ‘Other’ in Israeli and Palestinian School Books”(opens another site in a new tab)

ExampleOne response from teachers on both sides: a joint project printed the Israeli and Palestinian accounts of the same events side by side. Rather than a shared account, it sought “to allow each community’s historical perspective to stand on its own.”[12]Learning Each Other’s Historical Narrative (PRIME)(opens another site in a new tab)

Contact and news

How often Israelis and Palestinians meet depends on where they live, their citizenship and restrictions on movement, and many follow different news. Partisans can also see the same coverage differently: in a 1985 study, pro-Israeli and pro-Arab viewers shown the same television coverage of the Beirut massacre each “rated these programs, and those responsible for them, as being biased against their side.” The viewers were American university students.[13]Robert P. Vallone, Lee Ross and Mark R. Lepper, “The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology(opens another site in a new tab)

Among Palestinians

In a joint poll taken in December 2016, 12% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza said they had talked to Israelis “other than soldiers and settlers” in the past few months.[14]Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll (fieldwork December 2016)(opens another site in a new tab)

Among Jewish Israelis

In the same poll, 23% of Israeli Jews said they had talked to Palestinians in the past few months.[14]Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll (fieldwork December 2016)(opens another site in a new tab)

Arab citizens of Israel, polled separately. 78% said they had talked to Palestinians in the past few months.[14]Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll (fieldwork December 2016)(opens another site in a new tab)

ExampleAmong those who had talked, most described it as pleasant: 71% of Palestinians, and 95% of Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel taken together. Those who talk are not necessarily typical of those who do not.[14]Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll (fieldwork December 2016)(opens another site in a new tab)

Objections to this approach

Explaining the conflict through memory and psychology is itself disputed, from more than one direction.

Nadim Rouhana, a scholar of reconciliation in national conflicts, argues that the relations between Israelis and Palestinians have to be examined “in the context of power relations and identity-based conflicts”: two peoples each holding an account of the past are not on equal terms.[15]Nadim N. Rouhana, “Group identity and power asymmetry in reconciliation processes: The Israeli-Palestinian case,” Peace and Conflict 10(1), abstract(opens another site in a new tab)

Israel’s Education Ministry and Ministry of Strategic Affairs rejected the 2013 schoolbook study. The Ministry of Strategic Affairs said that the study’s approach and tone reflect “an attempt to create an artificial and inaccurate picture of balance between Palestinian and Israeli books.”[16]Statements by Israel’s Education Ministry and Ministry of Strategic Affairs on the schoolbook study, 4 February 2013(opens another site in a new tab)

This page does not settle these objections. It describes how readings form; the question pages test the claims themselves.

Beyond this conflict

The tendency to see the same coverage as biased against one’s own side is not confined to Israelis and Palestinians. In the 1985 study of television coverage of the Beirut massacre, described above under “Contact and news,” the viewers were students at Stanford University in the United States, some with pro-Israeli views and some with pro-Arab views, and each group judged the same news reports biased against its own side. Noticing such tendencies does not show that all accounts are equally accurate; it describes how readers, including readers of this page, may see the same material differently.[13]Robert P. Vallone, Lee Ross and Mark R. Lepper, “The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology(opens another site in a new tab)

Where to go next

Sources

  1. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 14 May 1948 (opens another site)Avalon Project, Yale Law School
  2. Yom HaAtzma’ut 1949 (opens another site)Hebcal Jewish Calendar
  3. Commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the Nakba (opens another site)United Nations, Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People
  4. Daniel Bar-Tal, Neta Oren and Rafi Nets-Zehngut, “Sociopsychological analysis of conflict-supporting narratives: A general framework,” Journal of Peace Research (opens another site)Tel Aviv University research portal
  5. Adam Waytz, Liane L. Young and Jeremy Ginges, “Motive attribution asymmetry for love vs. hate drives intractable conflict,” PNAS (opens another site)Boston College Morality Lab (author copy)
  6. Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll, summary report (fieldwork 17–29 July 2024) (opens another site)Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University
  7. Jeremy Ginges, Scott Atran, Douglas Medin and Khalil Shikaki, “Sacred bounds on rational resolution of violent political conflict,” PNAS (opens another site)MIT (copy of the PNAS article)
  8. Masi Noor, Nurit Shnabel, Samer Halabi and Arie Nadler, “When Suffering Begets Suffering: The Psychology of Competitive Victimhood Between Adversarial Groups in Violent Conflicts,” Personality and Social Psychology Review (opens another site)Tel Aviv University research portal
  9. The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll: Press Release (fieldwork July 2024) (opens another site)Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
  10. Richard Rogers and Anat Ben-David, “Coming to terms: a conflict analysis of the usage, in official and unofficial sources, of ‘security fence’, ‘apartheid wall’, and other terms for the structure between Israel and the Palestinian territories,” Media, War & Conflict (opens another site)Bar-Ilan University research portal
  11. Bruce Wexler, Sami Adwan and Daniel Bar-Tal, “Victims of Our Own Narratives? Portrayal of the ‘Other’ in Israeli and Palestinian School Books” (opens another site)Council of Religious Institutions of the Holy Land
  12. Learning Each Other’s Historical Narrative (PRIME) (opens another site)Georg Eckert Institute, EFREC database
  13. Robert P. Vallone, Lee Ross and Mark R. Lepper, “The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (opens another site)University of Wisconsin (course copy)
  14. Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll (fieldwork December 2016) (opens another site)Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University
  15. Nadim N. Rouhana, “Group identity and power asymmetry in reconciliation processes: The Israeli-Palestinian case,” Peace and Conflict 10(1), abstract (opens another site)The Fletcher School, Tufts University
  16. Statements by Israel’s Education Ministry and Ministry of Strategic Affairs on the schoolbook study, 4 February 2013 (opens another site)IMRA (reproduction)

All the sources this site uses →

Change history

  • The Independence Day paragraph now says what Jewish Israelis celebrate, as the Nakba paragraph does, quoting the 1948 Declaration.
  • The 1948 opening now describes both commemorations in the same way: the Nakba as the displacement of hundreds of thousands in the 1948 war, by flight and expulsion.
  • Tighten wordings.
  • Modify titles.
  • First publications.